

Forced Migrants or Voluntary Exiles: Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria in Turkey

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Abstract Turkey has been experiencing various types of migration flows since the foundation of the Republic in 1923. Migration of ethnic Turks of Bulgaria in 1989 is one of the important immigration waves in size and in nature as well. More than 350,000 Bulgarian Turks refusing to assimilation policies of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) fled to Turkey in 1989. Behind this triggering political reason, there were deeper sources of this migration, such as economic, social, institutional and cultural exclusion/inclusion problems in Bulgaria. Furthermore, most of the Turks of Bulgaria kept the idea of migrating to their “imagined motherland” someday. The same migrants have been experiencing integration/exclusion problems where they settled in Turkey, too. This paper attempts to open a conceptual debate by using concepts of ‘mixed migration’, ‘accidental diaspora’ and ‘voluntary exiles’ to overcome the ‘forced and voluntary’ dichotomy in this literature, rather than analysing all the dimensions in detail. Hence, the multiple dimensions of this migration will be tried to be understood via the perceptions of migrants.

Keywords Forced/voluntary migration · Mixed migration · Accidental diaspora · Voluntary exiles · Imagined motherland

Introduction

Turkey has been experiencing emigration, immigration and forced migration flows since the foundation of the Republic in 1923. Migration of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey is one of the most important immigration waves that Turkey has experienced.

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For majority of the ethnic Turk migrants from Bulgaria, returning to their ‘imagined motherland’¹ was a ‘natural’ process from the nationalistic perspective. Their hope was to find their roots in the ‘imagined motherland’. However, on their arrival in Turkey, some of the migrants started to notice their cultural differences from the locals. Furthermore, they had left Bulgaria as Turks but transformed into Bulgarians or göçmen (migrants) after arriving upon Turkey even though they received Turkish citizenship almost on arrival. They were ‘soydaş’ (kinsman) at best, but this labelling also implies the idea of otherness to the native Turks and their distance from the imagined motherland. This shows that the official citizenship is not enough to be accepted in the society, because the notion of citizenship is constructed more culturally than officially. According to Gulalp (2006) in the popular-cultural framework, groups which form the majority of the society or in the hegemonic status regardless of their numbers determine who has the right to be a member of that society and who should be excluded.

Migration of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey started in 1878 and continued periodically, the last mass migration from Bulgaria to Turkey occurred in 1989. More than 350,000 Bulgarian Turks refusing to assimilation policies, namely ‘revival or rebirth process’, of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) fled to Turkey. Immigration from Bulgaria to Turkey continued at a high pace until the 2000s. It is estimated that each year 30,000 Bulgarian Turks emigrated to Turkey during 1990–1997 period (Dimitrova 1998). According to Parla (2007, p. 157) the post-1990 migrations have more irregular character and differs from the 1989 migration flows in terms of legal treatment and local reception. Majority of the 1989 immigrants had applied for, and received, Turkish citizenship when they arrived in Turkey because they were migrated under privileged circumstances. However, these people still face adaptation problems in Turkey related to economic, spatial, political and cultural issues.

Geographically, most of the migrants are settled in the Western part of Turkey where their relatives live.² The Western part of Turkey has been a more developed area in terms of its social, economic, environmental and urban-planning standards compared with the other parts of Turkey. However, the places these people settled in this area are degraded in terms of employment, educational and infrastructural facilities and accessing the utilities provided by the municipalities. Therefore, the ethnic Turks of Bulgaria still have integration problems to the Turkish society.

This study is a part of a more comprehensive project that explores the multi-dimensional character of ethnic Turks migration from Bulgaria, especially their spatial, economic, social and cultural integration/segregation processes in four major cities (Ankara, Bursa, İzmir and Tekirdağ) in the Western part of Turkey by implementing large-scale field studies as well as using quantitative techniques. A small portion of this data is utilised in the limited framework of this article to discuss the usefulness of suggested conceptualizations below and to overcome the ‘forced and voluntary’ dichotomy in this literature.

¹ We use the concept of ‘imagined motherland’ being inspired from the famous work of Anderson (1991). We use ‘homeland’ for Bulgaria and ‘motherland’ for Turkey throughout the text with respect to migrants’ own perceptions on the subject, except direct quotations from other writers.

² Most of the Turks of Bulgaria have relatives in Turkey who migrated before 1989.

Our aim in this paper is to open a debate on the multi-dimensional nature of this and similar migration flows in light of terms like mixed migration, voluntary exiles, accidental diaspora and to inquire the possibilities these terms offer in the case of migration of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey in 1989. Every migration flow has triggering or visible reasons, but when it is looked at beyond these reasons, there are accumulation of different reasons and contingent factors at the background which are invisible in character and which make those migrations unique and worth investigating. On the other hand, because migration is itself a dynamic process, whatever the motivations start them and give them their special colours, these colours can also change on the way as well as migrants' own experiences. Hence, 'mixed migration' as a term may be useful to incorporate different dimensions of migration flows and to avoid reductionist approaches.

Conceptual Discussion: Voluntary Exile, Accidental Diaspora and Mixed Migration

Migrations are usually classified in terms of voluntary/involuntary and political/economic dichotomies with voluntary migration corresponding to economic and involuntary migration to political. However, it is not meaningful to conceive migration with these oppositions, therefore, some researchers argue to move beyond this dichotomy (Brubaker 2009; Van Hear 2010). The terms of 'diaspora', 'accidental diaspora' and especially 'mixed migration' are the examples of escaping this dichotomy.

The usage of 'diaspora' has changed considerably, recently both 'exile' and 'diaspora' are often taken to refer to various national, cultural, religious and political groups and peoples (Baumann 2010). 'Exile' refers to the ideas of forced migration, displacement, social and political marginalisation of an individual or a group of refugees. It causes the feeling of loneliness, foreignness, homesickness and therefore an enduring longing to remigrate to the place of origin. As a result, some people refrain from moving into exile and staying there. 'Exile is a state forced upon individuals, groups or a nation; they are passive reactors subjected to this state' (Baumann 2010, p. 19). Usually, exiles think of their exile situation as a temporary state and their focus of identification, attention and activities clearly rests with the territory and culture of their former home. Since exile is conceived of as transitory, the state of exile may end with repatriation. However, sometimes individuals and groups may want to be an 'exile' in order to live in better situation in terms of economic and social standards.

Brubaker (2009, p. 461) states that the term 'diaspora' has enjoyed a spectacular career in the social sciences and humanities but its meaning has become less and less clear. He defines diaspora as 'notion of dispersion in space and some reference to an actual or imagined homeland, from which the diaspora has become separated, yet towards which it remains oriented in some way—emotionally, imaginatively, or politically'. Therefore, there is a close connection that links diaspora, homeland and motherland. He offers a new concept of diaspora namely 'the accidental diasporas' which belong to a very different world. These diasporas, according to him, may be characterised as post-multi-national. These diasporas came into existence with the disintegration of the Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman Empires after the First World War, and of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia at the end of socialism

(Brubaker 1995, 1998). We think that the term ‘accidental diasporas’ is suitable for the ethnic Turks of Bulgaria because they became ‘accidental diasporas’ ‘... by the movement of border across people... suddenly following a dramatic—and often traumatic—reconfiguration of political space ... without the participation, and often against the will, of their members... tend to be more concentrated and territorially rooted ... finally, members of accidental diasporas are citizens of the countries in which they live’ as stated by Brubaker (2009, pp. 461–462). The situation of the Turks living in Bulgaria after 1878 carries all these five characteristics attributed to accidental diasporas by Brubaker.

Bulgaria was one of the Balkan states that emerged during the second half of the nineteenth century after the demise of the Ottoman Empire and gained autonomy in 1878. Hence, Turkish minority living in Bulgaria became accidental diaspora through the reconfiguration of the borders when Bulgaria gained its independence in 1908 from Ottoman Empire. Ottoman retreat from Balkans accompanied by large-scale emigrations of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey which continued until late 1990s (Höpken 1997, p. 54; Çetin 2008a; Dişbudak and Purkis 2012). During these years, different migration flows to Turkey have had different triggering elements and distinguishing natures. Reconfiguration of the borders clearly exposed the Turkish minority dramatic and traumatic experiences, i.e. pressures on ethnic-religious identity, culture and/or exclusion from the social processes due to Westernisation/modernisation policies of political elites before, during and after socialist regime (Höpken 1997; Erdinç 2002; Çetin 2008a, b, 2009). Parla (2006) poses a crucial question at this point on situating nearly half of the 1989 migrants who went back to Bulgaria soon after immigrating to Turkey and points out blurring and confusing meaning of the terms return migration and diaspora in explaining this phenomenon. Parla herself gives the answer again by saying .. *Perhaps the most recurrent sentiment expressed during the course of my fieldwork among Bulgarian Turkish immigrants was that after having been persecuted by the government in Bulgaria because they were ‘Turkish’, they were marginalized in Turkey by the local population because they were ‘Bulgarian’.* This double exclusion results with the feeling of not belonging properly anywhere for the migrants (although they do not see themselves as migrants neither in Bulgaria nor in Turkey) and it is one of the most common experiences among migrants all over the world. The term mixed migration enables us to solve this confusion and to move beyond.

In a sense, every migration is a forced migration and implies displacement. Because anthropologically and sociologically people do not tend to leave their social environment easily. Van Hear (2010) also contends that the division of ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ migration is problematic. Therefore, he proposes the usage of a recently popular term called mixed migration, which is in the intersection between the so-called voluntary and forced migration. For him, migration can be ‘mixed’ in several senses. One of them is related to stages of the migratory process: motivations may be mixed at the point of making the decision to move. Because the decision of movement almost always involves varying combinations of choice and compulsion, people may travel with others in mixed migratory flows. The motivations of migrants may change in the migratory process, and people may find themselves in mixed communities during their journeys or at their destination. Hence, the migration is mixed (Van Hear 2010). Many forced migrants may decide to migrate for reuniting with motherland, economic betterment, studying, marrying or other reasons, even in the case of conflicts.

Among others, Sheffer (2003) argues that diasporas are made and unmade as a result of shifting borders and the formation and the collapse of states. Therefore, recently, researchers departed from the view that all diasporas are 'exilic communities'. Accordingly, one should focus on the personal and small group considerations as well as the notion of regime (or political) change while understanding diasporas and exile.

We agree that political dimension and other factors amounts to much the same thing and they must be understood in the frameworks in which they occur. Therefore, it is not possible to classify the movements of people as voluntary or involuntary easily. In the case of ethnic Turks migration from Bulgaria to Turkey, the visible reason is political, and thus it seems that it can easily be classified as forced migration (Eminov 1997; Karpas 1990; Şimşir 1986). However, the field study proved that the situation cannot be easily labelled. When it is examined closely, as it is shown below, behind this triggering political reason there are economic, institutional, political and spatial exclusion of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria before migration. Since this article does not aim at analysing all these dimensions in detail, rather it attempts to open a conceptual debate to be able to overcome the 'forced and voluntary' dichotomy, these dimensions are exemplified by the experiences and perceptions of migrants who have been excluded in Bulgaria as well as in Turkey.

Even though migrants of 1989 seem to have full right citizenship of both countries, currently formal citizenship that embodies a collective identity beyond identities of ethnic, religious and social class by equalising citizens in front of the law has been replaced by new hierarchies of identities such as race, ethnicity, religion, sex and sexual orientation. These groups that are subjected to different forms of exclusion depending on diverse identities they have, prevented from fully participating in public life as a result of a hierarchy created by legislation about their citizenship entitlements (Sassen 2006, p. 180). Equality referred by the definitions of formal citizenship no longer means equality in economic, social, political and cultural senses. Racism and discrimination, both within state institutions (e.g. the police) and from societal actors such as employers or landlords, can be important barriers to the actual realisation of equal rights (Koopmans et al. 2005, p. 32). Despite holding citizenship, channels for economic, social and political mobilisation can be closed for minorities to a wide extent. According to in-depth interviews, before migration these channels were mostly obstructed for the ethnic Turks living in Bulgaria. In-depth interviews exposed us strong economic and spatial reasons underlying visible political reasons. Such as when working in Bulgaria channels for upward mobility for even well-educated Turks were hindered by invisible obstacles. This was the most common example given by the interviewees. Institutional discrimination in terms of participating in every aspect of social life has strong spatial dimension. Majority of Turks in Bulgaria (and in Turkey) lived in the same neighbourhoods away from the public services such as university education, cultural life etc. These restrictions also prevented them from participating from public life fully. The Turks of Bulgaria generally lived in rural areas before migration where not only was access to university education but also high school education was limited because of economic and spatial conditions. Majority of Turks were directed to go to the vocational schools in nearby towns. During the field study, majority of migrants pointed out that educational system excluded successful Turkish students from taking a university degree; thereby, channels for them to access high profile positions in the

society were blocked. Majority of them, at best, could acquire intermediate staff positions.

‘When I wanted to enroll the university, Bulgarian authorities asked me to sign a paper which guarantees my staying in Bulgaria after graduation, but I refused to sign such a paper, as a result I wasn’t able to go to the university’ (male, 63, İzmir/Sarıç, 03.06.2011).

‘I was a primary school teacher in Bulgaria. There was a vacant principal position at my school and I was the only one who qualified for the position, but only because of my ethnic origin I wasn’t appointed. The position stayed vacant until the Bulgarian principal appointed from another school. The worst of all, my wife couldn’t help but hear when educational visiting officers were talking among them about my ethnic origin without being aware of my wife.’ (male, 65, Tekirdağ/Çorlu, 05.07.2011)

Therefore, we consider these migrants as ‘forced migrants’ as well as ‘mixed migrants’ or ‘voluntary exiles’ without ignoring political factors. They may be considered as forced migrants because they could not exercise their formal citizenship rights in a society due to their minority position. They may also be considered as mixed migrants because their migration decision has voluntary as well as involuntary aspects. They are at the same time voluntary exiles because they always kept the idea of going back 1 day to their imagined motherland in their heart, and even though they have integration problems in Turkey, they do not want to return to Bulgaria to live. In general, ethnic return migration was intended to be permanent, specifically, the Turks of Bulgaria came to Turkey with this intention and returning to Bulgaria is was excluded as an option. On the other hand, during the fieldwork, one of the respondents told us an interesting story, which indicates the mixed character of this migration as well.

‘My brother came to Turkey with us and he sworn that he would never go back to Bulgaria. He even took ‘Dönmez’ (which means ‘never returns’ in Turkish) as his surname. But his family pressured him continuously, and he couldn’t stand against their will. Therefore, they went back to Bulgaria a few months after coming here’ (female, 58, İzmir, 05.06.2011).

It is estimated that around one third of 1989 migrants went back to Bulgaria. There were several factors that pushed them from Turkey such as difficulties of finding jobs consistent with their qualifications, poor workplace conditions and extreme working hours for low wages, cultural differences including conservative attitudes of Turkish society generally, sexist approaches against women and being exposed to social exclusion by the natives. On the other hand, there were also pull factors to go back to Bulgaria, such as more land and suitable houses left behind by their relatives in Bulgaria after migrating, better life standards in rural Bulgaria than in Turkey’s urban areas, changing climate in Bulgaria at the end of 1989 with the reversal of the Zhivkov regime’s assimilation policies (Goncharova 2013). Ironically, some of these returnees changed their minds again and they decided to come back to Turkey, because they could not find the conditions as they had expected. In spite of weakening official and

political exclusion policies, discriminatory attitudes of Bulgarians to the ethnic Turks had not changed. In Bulgarian eyes only, Roma have a worse image than Turks (Höpken 1997, p. 77). Also, economic reforms implemented in the post-socialist Bulgaria affected Turks and other minorities much more negatively than Bulgarians.

Especially after the collapse of socialism, Turks, Pomaks and the Roma suffered a serious loss of their living standards because of the closure of state enterprises, the loss of export markets and unequal access to land restitution and employment, and Turks, increasingly turned to Turkey for jobs and other forms of assistance (Erdoğan 2002).

Accumulation of combination of several factors and different types of social exclusion (i.e. economic, legal, institutional, spatial) in different periods in a society paves the way for migration waves in different natures. Mixed migration as a term may be useful for analysing 1989 migration of Turks of Bulgaria to Turkey and its changing nature in the process.

Brief Historical Background

Turkish settlements in Eastern Europe or the Balkans date back to fourteenth century. The majority of Turkish people came to Eastern Europe and the Balkans as a result of the Ottoman occupation of these territories—from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries. As a consequence, Turkish people kept Turkish as their mother tongue or used it at least as a common language when communicating among themselves. Besides, these people continue to exercise Islamic rules.

Schlögel states that ‘nowhere was the map of peoples so complex and complicated as in the Balkans’ referring to Brubaker’s (1998) ‘unmixing’ populations. He argues that the first modern case of expulsion of people before the instrument of population exchange was brought into use in the earlier twentieth century. The Balkan Turks were forced out of the newly emerging states in the Balkans for many times. In the aftermath of the Balkan wars, the first systematic ‘mass exodus’ occurred with forced migration, changes of family names, expulsions and atrocities (Schlögel 2003). When the Balkan War (1913) was over, the conflicts between people seemed to be solved and the problems were not as severe as in the past.

During the second half of the twentieth century, the Turks of Bulgaria continued migrating to the imagined ‘motherland’, land of their ancestors. These migration flows, however, took place at different times and on very different scales. Forced or contractual ‘return migration’ to the motherland has a long history that precedes the ‘rebirth process’ in Bulgaria. During the Cold War period, several waves of Turkish migration took place when Bulgarian government permitted. Two migration waves occurred for example in 1950/1951 and 1968, approximately 250,000 Turks of Bulgaria came to Turkey.

Approximately 1,200,000 people immigrated to Turkey between 1878 and 1988 permanently (Çetin 2008a). Large-scale emigration from Bulgaria to Turkey started again in 1989 because of the increasing political pressures on Turkish people during the early 1980s and continued after the collapse of socialism. As a consequence, more than 500,000 Turks have come to Turkey from Bulgaria since the late 1980s (Dimitrova 1998; Çetin 2008a).

According to Höpken (1997, p. 64) when communist took the power in 1944, they aimed primarily to create socialist Turkish minority rather than restricting their ethnic rights. Hence, the shift in identity among the Turks of Bulgaria from a religious to a secular ethnic consciousness accelerated. Nevertheless, success of this policy was limited. In spite of many incentives, Turks and other Muslims were reluctant to join the Communist Party and they continued to cling their religion, language and customs. The policies of socialist secularisation/modernisation of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria were one of the main reasons of sudden migrations soon after the 1950s. Communist Party reduced these policies step by step from the late 1950s and during the mid-1980s endeavoured to eliminate it completely. Policy was gradually directed at undermining not merely of religious affiliation but also of the separate ethnic identity of Turks and Muslims for the purpose of creating communist nationalism in which ethnic and religious differences would disappear in favour of a common socialist identity. This policy reached its peak in 1984–1985 with the so-called rebirth campaign and it meant in practice forced assimilation and repression (Höpken 1997, pp. 65–68; Çetin 2009; Poulton 1997; Eminov 1997). Policies of changing Turkish names to Bulgarian ones, banning public use of their language, preventing religious practices in the name of building socialist Bulgarian nation attracted foreign pressure and Zhivkov opened the borders to the Turkish minority in 1989. On the other hand, Turkey was willing to accept these migrants for more than one reason.

Prior to this large-scale migration flow to Turkey, there were severe problems in the Turkish labour market. Labour unions which demanded higher wages and better working conditions started the ‘spring uprising’ against the government in March 1989. Immigration of the Turks of Bulgaria was a good opportunity for the government and the capitalists to keep wages under pressure. Furthermore, the migrants could fill the gap of semi-qualified labour need of Turkish industry. The migrants were seen as the source of demand for reviving building sector in Turkey as well. When the number of migrants became uncontrollable, Turkish authorities revised their policy of admitting the Turks of Bulgaria without visas (Eminov 1997) and departed from the encouraging immigration policies.

Immigration and integration of 1989 Bulgarian Turks to the Turkish Society exhibits similarities with ethnic Russians and European Jews migrating to Israel, the Greek and the German ethnic returnees from the former Soviet Union following the collapse of socialism. All these people may be thought as ‘accidental diasporas’ where they were living before migrating. In each case, accidental diasporas did not see themselves as ‘immigrants’ neither in homeland nor in motherland. In general, they involved in long gradual migration movements towards motherland (Ohliger and Münz 2003).

Many ethnic Turks fled or were expelled from Bulgaria in 1989. Turkey provided a special legal framework for these migrants, enabling them to immigrate under privileged circumstances and to naturalise upon arrival. Thus, ethnic Turk migrants not only had privileged access to the ‘motherland’ society, but they also benefited from privileged integration measures such as welfare and integration programmes, settling and housing programmes, vocational training or retraining.

In the case of ethnic return migration, the states usually take extraordinary measures to integrate their co-ethnics, for example, the Greek and the German governments undertaken state assistance measures, unavailable to ‘ordinary’ foreign migrants coming from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and other countries (Ohliger and Münz 2003;

Hess 2008). The Turks of Bulgaria were treated similarly by the Turkish authorities, they were welcomed favourably, but they have faced integration problems after resettling to their imagined motherland. These problems vary from material—such as, housing in less affluent areas, residential segregation and difficulties in the labour market with high qualifications acquired in Bulgaria but low pay in Turkey—to factors of more psychological and emotional nature that include mutually felt differences in socialisation, mentality and expectations between newcomers and hosts. These have led to conflicting inter-group relations (Hess 2008). As a result, integration problems have continued although ‘repatriates’ having arrived over 20 years ago. Similar to ethnic Greeks and ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union, a number of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria continue to keep strong ties with Bulgaria in different nature and intensity.

The influx of Turkish expellees from Bulgaria and their integration to Turkey seemed to create no conflicts in the beginning, as these expellees were welcomed by natives and official authorities. However, the mixed nature of their migration (voluntary/involuntary), along with the social and cultural differences has created integration problems.

Methodological Approach

Data of this study obtained from the more comprehensive project in the subject prepared for the The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBİTAK). In the framework of the project, we conducted a large-scale field survey, carried out during May–October 2010 and in-depth interviews in May–August 2011 in four cities. We consulted and collaborated with the migrants’ associations in these cities. They assisted our attempt to approach this population group in a more direct way in order to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the data, and thus the reliability of the study.

The questionnaire was designed to provide personal data on the economically active population, demographic characteristics, employment and education characteristics and other data. Collectively, these data enabled us to determine the degree of adaptation to Turkish society. The first questions were general and referred to the personal characteristics of the individual respondent: Gender, nationality, religion, educational level, marital status and other private information. Most of the other questions were formatted using multiple choice questions and engineered to extract different dimensions of this specific migration. In total, 1632 persons were surveyed, 1039 men and 593 women. This population constitutes the reference set on which the remainder of our study is based. Besides, over 50 in-depth interviews were implemented as well. We only use a small portion of the data to open a conceptual discussion about the migration of the Turks of Bulgaria.

During the field research, the main problem we encountered was the disbelief and suspiciousness on the part of the migrant respondents. Some of them feared that they would be persecuted. However, most of them were eventually convinced of the true nature and the possible positive results of this research.

When a massive exodus of a diaspora from a host country occurs, all members of diaspora do not leave and return to the historical motherland. Even under the harshest circumstances in the host country, almost always some members remain behind

(Sheffer 2003). Analysing and explaining human action, it should be a necessity to listen what people tell about their action, on the other hand, what their ‘characteristics’ and the social context behind them ‘tell’ is more important (Kulu 1998, p. 316).

Perceptions of Migrants and Natives: the Fieldwork

From our field research, we concluded that from the migrant’s perspective, the triggering reason for their immigration was the policies of BCP and the ‘minority syndrome’, and the choice of Turkey as their destination country instead of any other country is due to the fact that they always considered Turkey as their historical motherland.

Profile of Migrants

Table 1 shows the age and gender structure of the respondents. The majority of respondents are male (1032) because it was difficult to convince females (593) for

Table 1 Age and gender

	Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
19–29			
Count	226	83	309
% within gender	21.8 %	14.0 %	18.9 %
30–39			
Count	165	99	264
% within gender	15.9 %	16.7 %	16.2 %
40–49			
Count	179	122	301
% within gender	17.2 %	20.6 %	18.4 %
50–59			
Count	253	169	422
% within gender	24.4 %	28.5 %	25.9 %
60–69			
Count	137	77	214
% within gender	13.2 %	13.0 %	13.1 %
70–79			
Count	72	40	112
% within gender	6.9 %	6.7 %	6.9 %
80–89			
Count	7	3	10
% within gender	7 %	5 %	6 %
Total			
Count	1039	593	1632
% within gender	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %

the interview compared with males. Age structure of the respondents seems to be equally distributed; 79.4 % of respondents are between 19 and 59 years old, which means that majority of them are in the working age.

Table 2 illustrates the educational attainment of the migrants. The first thing to notice is that most of the women are only primary school graduates. The second one is male migrants are mainly vocational high school graduates (47.1 %). This table tells us that while 26.6 % of the migrants are primary school graduates, this same rate for native Turks is almost 70 %. This means the migrants are well over the average of native Turks in terms of educational attainment but more than half of the migrants' works do not correspond to their education. The largest portion of them are factory workers (26.3 %), engineers/technicians (13.2 %) and self-employed (13.1 %). The rest works generally in the labour intensive service sector jobs. Generally, labour force participation rate among migrants is higher than natives, but this is especially true for female migrants. On the other hand, unemployment rate among migrants is higher than the general rate for Turkey. Also, Union membership is lower than the general rate for all workers. These data reflect that privileged entrance status of Turks of Bulgaria did not change their status in the labour market as 'migrants'.

The Turks of Bulgaria as privileged migrants have no problems in getting citizenship. As Table 3 shows, almost 99 % of the migrants is Turkish citizens. Therefore, there is no legal problem in terms of integration. However, for the full integration as mentioned before citizenship is not sufficient. Besides, in the case of 'mixed' migration,

Table 2 Gender and education

	Gender and education		Total
	Male	Female	
Illiterates			
Count	4	2	6
% within gender	4 %	3 %	4 %
Primary school			
Count	221	212	433
% within gender	21.3 %	35.8 %	26.5 %
High school			
Count	156	110	266
% within gender	15.0 %	18.5 %	16.3 %
Vocational school			
Count	489	172	661
% within gender	47.1 %	29.0 %	40.5 %
University graduates			
Count	169	97	266
% within gender	16.3 %	16.4 %	16.3 %
Total			
Count	1039	593	1632
% within gender	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %

Table 3 Citizenship

	Frequency	Per cent	Cumulative per cent
TR	1611	98.7	98.7
Bulgaria	20	1.2	99.9
Other	1	1	100.0
Total	1632	100.0	

it seems that citizenship has a minor importance. If the channels for economic, social and political upward mobilisation are closed to a wide extent, full integration is not possible.

Table 4 illustrates the causes of migration from the migrants' perspectives. When the respondents were asked about the reason for their migration, the majority of them told us that the triggering reason is political pressure and changing the names of Turkish origin. Since many respondents were not adult at the time of the migration, they answered as 'I am here because my family came.' The third group is the voluntary migrants; they have always been eager to come to Turkey but since migration was forbidden before 1989, they could not leave Bulgaria. This table also indicates mixed character of the migration. Even though the visible reason for their migration in 1989 was 'revival' policies, nearly 60 % of migrants attributed the cause of their migration to different reasons.

The ethnic character of the migrants is obvious; all of them are ethnic Turks. However, when we ask them to describe themselves, only 75 % of them answered as 'Turk'. The others mainly answered as 'Muslim' or 'migrant' (Table 5).

Table 4 The causes of migration from the migrants' perspectives

	Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
I had to come because my family came	333 32.1 %	157 26.5 %	490 30.0 %
I came to work	3 3 %	4 7 %	7 4 %
I wanted to come anyway because Turkey is my motherland	265 25.5 %	111 18.7 %	376 23.0 %
I came because of the policies to change our names and political pressures	431 41.5 %	314 53.0 %	745 45.6 %
Other	7 7 %	7 1.2 %	14 9 %
Total	1039 100.0 %	593 100.0 %	1632 100.0 %

Table 5 How the migrants describe themselves?

	Frequency	Per cent	Cumulative per cent
Turk	1211	74.2	74.2
Muslim	223	13.7	87.9
Occupational Class	18	1.1	89.0
Migrant	168	10.3	99.4
Other	10	6	100.0
Total	1632	100.0	

Self-describing of the migrants does not change by employment status. Only, in cases of housewives and students, while ‘Muslim’ and ‘migrant’ answers are higher, ‘Turk’ answer is lower than the other categories (Table 6). These two categories feel the exclusion stronger than others. The stronger the feeling of exclusion, the weaker the belonging. Hence, percentages of housewives and students self-describing as Turks are lower than the others. This situation reproduces itself in a vicious circle.

When we asked the respondents, ‘how the locals may describe you?’ the majority of them (45.8 %) think that the locals describe them as ‘the migrants’. It is surprising that 40 % of the migrants still think that the locals call them ‘Bulgarians’ or ‘Bulgarian Turks’ (Table 7). For the ethnic Turks from Bulgaria, being called as ‘Bulgarian’ or

Table 6 How the migrants describe themselves? (by occupation)

	Occupation							Total
	Employed	Unemployed	Retired	Temporary workers	Students	Working students	Housewife	
Turk	513	107	510	13	14	12	42	1211
	74.5 %	70.9 %	76.7 %	72.2 %	63.6 %	66.7 %	60.9 %	74.2 %
Muslim	69	21	114	2	4	1	12	223
	10.0 %	13.9 %	17.1 %	11.1 %	18.2 %	5.6 %	17.4 %	13.7 %
Occupation Class	9	2	4	0	1	1	1	18
	1.3 %	1.3 %	6 %	0 %	4.5 %	5.6 %	1.4 %	1.1 %
Migrant	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	2
	0 %	0 %	2 %	0 %	0 %	5.6 %	0 %	1 %
Other	92	18	36	2	3	3	14	168
	13.4 %	11.9 %	5.4 %	11.1 %	13.6 %	16.7 %	20.3 %	10.3 %
Total	6	3	0	1	0	0	0	10
	9 %	2.0 %	0 %	5.6 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	6 %
Total	689	151	665	18	22	18	69	1632
	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %

Table 7 According to the migrants, how do the locals describe them?

	Frequency	Per cent	Cumulative per cent
Turk	198	12.1	12.1
Muslim	11	7	12.8
Occupational	23	1.4	14.2
Class	3	2	14.4
Migrant	748	45.8	60.2
Bulgarian or Bulgarian Turks	643	39.4	99.6
Other	6	4	100.0
Total	1632	100.0	

‘Bulgarian Turks’ is very insulting. This perception is more common among the spatially segregated migrants.

Students and housewives are the groups that feel excluded the most. This may be the reason that a higher percentage of them were describing themselves as Muslims or migrants instead of Turks in Table 6. Employed and temporary workers feel that they are less excluded (Table 8).

Table 9 shows the perception of migrants by the native Turks in different cities. When we investigate whether there is a difference between the perceptions of migrants

Table 8 According to the migrants, how do the locals describe them? (by occupation)

	Occupation							Total
	Employed	Unemployed	Retired	Temporary workers	Students	Working students	Housewife	
Turk	91	17	81	2	2	3	2	198
	13.2 %	11.3 %	12.2 %	11.1 %	9.1 %	16.7 %	2.9 %	12.1 %
Muslim	3	1	7	0	0	0	0	11
	4 %	7 %	1.1 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	7 %
Occupation	15	0	8	0	0	0	0	23
	2.2 %	0 %	1.2 %	0 %	.0 %	.0 %	.0 %	1.4 %
Class	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	3
	0 %	7 %	2 %	0 %	0 %	5.6 %	0 %	2 %
Migrant	326	68	298	10	9	7	30	748
	47.3 %	45.0 %	44.8 %	55.6 %	40.9 %	38.9 %	43.5 %	45.8 %
Bulgarian or Bulgarian Turks	251	63	269	5	11	7	37	643
	36.4 %	41.7 %	40.5 %	27.8 %	50.0 %	38.9 %	53.6 %	39.4 %
Other	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	6
	4 %	7 %	2 %	5.6 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	4 %
Total	689	151	665	18	22	18	69	1632
	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %

Table 9 According to the migrants, how do the locals describe them? (by cities)

	Cities				Total
	Ankara	Bursa	İzmir	Tekirdağ	
Turk	37 9.1 %	38 9.0 %	72 18.0 %	51 12.6 %	198 12.1 %
Muslim	0 0 %	2 5 %	2 5 %	7 17 %	11 7 %
Occupation	4 10 %	7 17 %	8 20 %	4 10 %	23 14 %
Class	0 0 %	0 0 %	3 8 %	0 0 %	3 2 %
Migrant	169 41.5 %	135 32.1 %	240 60.0 %	204 50.5 %	748 45.8 %
Bulgarian or Bulgarian Turks	197 48.4 %	237 56.3 %	74 18.5 %	135 33.4 %	643 39.4 %
Other	0 0 %	2 5 %	1 3 %	3 7 %	6 4 %
Total	407 100.0 %	421 100.0 %	400 100.0 %	404 100.0 %	1632 100.0 %

in different cities by the locals, we find out that the highest rate is in Bursa where the largest Turks of Bulgaria live. The second is in Ankara, which is the capital city of Turkey. These two cities are more conservative in character than İzmir and Tekirdağ. Even though most of the migrants think of themselves as Turks (Tables 5 and 6), they are still perceived as Bulgarian and migrants in Turkey (Tables 7, 8 and 9), which the migrants found insulting.

The migrants mostly feel that Turkey is their 'motherland'. The rate of the migrants who still feel Bulgaria is their homeland is only a little more than 15 % (Table 10).

When we asked the migrants about the reason that they prefer to live in Turkey. They mainly (65 %) said that they wanted to live in Turkey because Turkey is their

Table 10 Where is your homeland (motherland)?

	Frequency	Per cent	Cumulative per cent
Turkey	1026	62.9	62.9
Bulgaria	198	12.1	75.0
First Turkey after Bulgaria	314	19.2	94.2
First Bulgaria after Turkey	59	36	979
Neither Turkey nor Bulgaria	2	1	980
Both Turkey and Bulgaria	33	20	1000
Total	1632	1000	

Table 11 Why do you prefer to live in Turkey?

	Frequency	Per cent	Cumulative per cent
Because it is my motherland	1069	655	65.5
Economic conditions are better	115	70	72.5
I feel more free	88	54	77.9
Because my relatives are here	38	23	80.3
I have no other place to go	18	11	81.4
My work and family are here	222	13.6	95.0
Other	6	4	95.3
N/A	76	4.7	100.0
Total	1632	100.0	

‘motherland’. When we asked the reason that they did not want to live in Bulgaria, the rate of the same answer decreased to 44 %. These two tables (Tables 11 and 12) show us that even though migrants feel loyal to Turkey, they do not really want to break their ties completely with their home country (Bulgaria) where their close relatives and friends still live. This also shows that for some migrants, Bulgaria is still their homeland, but for the majority, Turkey is their imagined motherland unlike majority of migrants in the age of globalisation who do not have a strong feeling of belonging neither of their home nor host countries.

Conclusions

In the case of forced ethnic migration, usually privileged ethnic migrants are justified through discourses of legitimation within ‘motherland’ societies. As members of the same ethnic origin diasporas either currently or historically have been exposed to discrimination, marginalisation or even persecution on ethnic grounds in other countries, therefore, the ‘motherland’ has a responsibility to support and rescue them (Ohliger and Münz 2003).

The Turks of Bulgaria, who chose to move to Turkey which they had always considered as their historical country of origin or the ‘motherland’, always thought

Table 12 Why do you not prefer to live in Bulgaria?

	Frequency	Per cent	Cumulative per cent
Economic	347	21.3	21.3
Political	321	19.7	40.9
Adaption problems	193	11.8	52.8
I wanted to live in Turkey which is my motherland	718	44.0	96.8
I would like to live in Bulgaria	28	1.7	98.5
Other	25	1.5	100.0
Total	1632	100.0	

that in Turkey they would find an appropriate ‘repatriation’ and ‘integration’ which would permit them to live properly, covering their needs for employment, education, housing, as well as finding their roots.

Ethnic return migration differs considerably from the other forms of migrations, while some common features such as the social and economic challenges of integration and the alienation from receiving societies exist. Although ethnic migrants are generally welcomed within the receiving countries by natives and officials, they do not always integrate as easily as expected at the beginning. Problems faced in the labour market, acceptance by the native population, exercising new traditions and different life styles are quite similar for the different groups of immigrants (Ohliger and Münz 2003). Therefore, it is not surprising that the Turks of Bulgaria still face severe problems in Turkey. In spite of these differences which create serious integration problems, majority of ethnic Turks of Bulgaria still prefer to stay in Turkey, i.e. imagined motherland, but without losing their ties with Bulgaria, their home country.

It can be concluded that neither political determinants nor the reasons for migration named by migrants on the discursive level of their consciousness, can solely explain the rise and evolution of the voluntary exile situation. This explains only one side of this migration; but, there were also strong indicators of institutional, social, economic and spatial discrimination that migrants were exposed to in Bulgarian society before migration. Even though these factors played important roles in migration decision, visible reason seemed as political pressures at the time. As a conclusion, we consider these migrants ‘forced migrants’ as well as ‘mixed migrants’ or ‘voluntary exiles’ without ignoring political factors to be able to encompass different dimensions of this migration.

The Turks of Bulgaria are forced migrants because they could not exercise their formal citizenship rights in a society due to their minority position in Bulgaria. They should be counted as mixed migrants because their migration decision has voluntary as well as involuntary aspects. Besides, they are voluntary exiles because they always kept the idea of going back someday to their imagined motherland in their heart, and even though they have integration problems in Turkey, they do not want to return to Bulgaria.

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